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writing, speaking, and listening

were cornerstones of Western rhetorical

studies for more than 2,000 years. But
in the 20th century recovery of rhetoric within composition studies, reading and writing reign as the dominant tropes for interpretive invention;1

speaking places a respectable third; listening runs a poor, poor fourth.
Krista Ratcliffe is an associate professor of English at Marquette University in Milwaukee, WI.
She teaches writing, rhetorical theory, and women's literature. Her scholarly work emerges at
the intersections of rhetorical theory, feminist theory, and reading/writing pedagogy, as evidenced by her book Anglo-American Feminist Challenges to the Rhetorical Tradition(s): Virginia
Woolf Mary Daly, and Adrienne Rich and her articles in Rhetoric Review, Studies in the Literary Imagination, and The Writing Instructor. Her current book-length study explores how rhetoric and
composition studies may recover listening in theory and praxis in ways that promote a feminist literacy-a literacy in which awareness of gender is complicated by other cultural categories, such as "race" (including whiteness). The purpose of such literacy, she argues, is to
facilitate cross-cultural dialogues in the classroom and beyond.
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Indeed, listening has been neglected. That's not to say listening has never
been mentioned within 20th-century scholarship. It has. For example,
James Phelan and Andrea Lunsford employ listening to explore voices
speaking or not speaking within written texts. Phelan posits listening as a
means of constructing "some conceptual model for defining and investigating voice in written discourse," particularlynarratives (132), and Lunsford offers listening as a means for reclaiming "the voices of women in
the history of rhetoric" (6), voices of women long dead who need no longer be silent if only we know how to listen for them.2 Yet these scholars' focus on voice elides sustained theorizing about listening. VictorVitanza also
employs listening not to discover individual voices but rather to play with/
in texts. By pondering Nietzschean, hermeneutic and poststructuralist
conversations about listening and the ear, Vitanza promotes listening as a
means of questioning the logos and exposing its "duplicity"/"triplicity"/
"complicity" within language (165-69). But despite the work of these
prominent scholars, the dominant trend in our field has been to follow the
lead of popular culture and naturalize listening-to assume it is something
that everyone does but no one need study. The implication for composition studies is quite simple: listening has almost ceased to be theorized or
taught as a rhetorical strategy.
For some time I have been wondering how listening may be recovered
so as to inform our field theoretically and pedagogically. In this article, I
want to suggest that rhetorical listening may be imagined, generally, as a
trope for interpretive invention, one on equal footing with the tropes of
reading and writing and speaking. Although rhetorical listening may be
employed to hear discursive intersections of any cultural categories (age
and class, nationality and history, religion and politics) and any cultural
positions (child and parent, patient and doctor, clergy and parishioner,
teacher and student) (see Pradl 67-72), my particular interest lies in how
it may help us to hear discursive intersections of gender and race/ethnicity'
(including whiteness) so as to help us to facilitate cross-cultural dialogues
about any topic. Thus, I want to suggest that rhetorical listening may be
imagined, specifically,as what Jacqueline Jones Royster has called a "code
of cross-cultural conduct."4
My purpose in offering this definition and this particularfocus is not to
construct a totalizing definition of listening; such an endeavor is impossible. Rather, my purpose is to invite further conversations on how listening
may inform composition studies. To that end, I make the following moves
in this article: (1) I briefly trace how rhetorical listening emerged in my
thinking; (2) I explore disciplinaryand cultural biases that subordinate listening to reading and writing and speaking; (3) I speculate why listening is
needed; (4) I offer an extended definition of rhetorical listening as a trope
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for interpretive invention; (5) I demonstrate how it may be employed as a
code of cross-cultural conduct; and (6) I listen to a student's listening.
The Emergence of Rhetorical Listening, or How I Started to Hear
My thinking about listening and its potential applications has emerged not
just from an abstract, scholarly interest in the intersections of rhetorical
theory and feminist theory but from several intertwining threads in my
academic and personal lives. Two related threads demonstrate the difficulty of and the need for listening, particularlywhen intersections of gender
and ethnicity intrude on cross-cultural conversations. The first thread
emerged when I presented a paper about Mary Daly at a Womanist Spirituality Conference in Columbia, Missouri. An African American woman in
the audience told me afterwardsthat she refuses to read Daly because Daly's critique of women in patriarchyis really just a critique of white women in patriarchy, one that excluded this audience member by erasing
differences
among women, a charge much like the one levelled against Daly
by Audre Lorde ("An Open Letter"70). The second thread emerged when
I taught a special topics course called "The Rhetorics of Women's Autobiographies."A young white woman in class said that, although she was extremely moved when reading excerpts from Audre Lorde's cancer
journals, she didn't want to read any more of Lorde's writings. When I
asked her why, she cited Lorde's last line: "If one Black woman I do not
know gains hope and strength from my story, then it has been worth the
difficulty of telling" (A Burstof Light295). The student felt that Lorde, by
specifying "Black woman," was excluding her by erasing commonalities
among women.
While I understand each woman's decision and recognize the power differentials of each situation, I find these threads troubling. Not only do they
expose each woman's difficulty in imagining simultaneous differences and
commonalities, they also resonate as metonymic echoes of larger cultural
discourses repeated not just by other students but by people all across our
country. What troubles me is that such reactions negate the possibility for
cross-cultural dialogue not just about gender and ethnicity but about any
subject. Although I certainly respect an individual's right to refrain from dialogue at a particularmoment in her or his life, I do not accept our culture's
dearth of discursive possibilities either for articulatingintersections of gender and ethnicity or for promoting cross-culturaldialogues.
Listening, it seems to me, might serve as one such possibility.But listening is hardly a simple solution; indeed, it raises many questions: Why is it
so hard to listen to one another? Why is it so hard to resist a guilt/blame
logic when we do listen? Why is it so hard to identify with one another
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when we feel excluded? Why is it so hard to focus simultaneously on commonalities and differences among ourselves? And how do the power differentials of our particularstandpoints influence our ability to listen? Any
definition of listening must account for these questions.
A third thread complicates the first two by exposing an all-too-often
missing component in gender/ethnicity discussions and in cross-cultural
discussions of any topic. That missing component is whiteness. While writing my book about Anglo-American feminist theories of rhetoric, I was
challenged by Susan Jarrattto consider how race informed gender in the
texts of VirginiaWoolf, Mary Daly, and Adrienne Rich. So I considered two
issues: one, the attitude that these women's texts expressed and represented about race/ethnicity and, two, the influence that whiteness played on
their texts. Yet when I completed the project, I was left with more question than conclusions. I wondered: What exactly is whiteness? How does
it function rhetorically, especially in relation with gender? And for whom
is whiteness (in)visible? And personally, I also wondered: How does my
life as a white woman affect my actions as a teacher at Marquette University, as a scholar in composition studies, as a mother who shops at Piggly
Wiggly in Cedarburg,WI, after work? What lessons am I (un)consciously
sending to my students, my readers, my neighbors, my daughter, myself?
A fourth thread provides language-a category-with which to contemplate one specific application of listening: articulating intersections of
gender and ethnicity to promote cross-cultural communication. When
Jacqueline Jones Royster gave her opening keynote address at the 1997
Feminisms and Rhetorics conference in Corvalis, OR, she challenged us all
to construct "codes of cross-cultural conduct," rhetorical strategies for fostering cross-cultural communication. Royster's challenge resonated with
me. Suddenly I saw an opening for my interest in rhetorical theory (the
absence of listening) to merge with my interest in feminist theory (the intersections of gender and ethnicity) as a means of doing my own gender/
race work, both professionally and personally.5 By weaving the above
threads together, I have created a place from which to ponder listening, or
rather what I have come to think of as rhetorical listening.
Why Neglect? or How Disciplinary and Cultural Biases
Displace Listening
One disciplinary bias that explains our field's neglect of listening may be
found, most obviously, in the work we do: we have appropriatedWestern
rhetorical theories to theorize writing and the teaching of writing. Because
we focus primarily on written discourse and because listening is commonly associated with oral discourse, we have been slow to imagine how lis-
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tening might inform our discipline. We have more readily paired writing
with reading and, to a lesser extent, with speaking. We pair writing with
reading because many teachers assume that improving students' reading
skills improves their writing skills. And although speaking is not our field's
primary province, we also pair it with writing. It haunts our theories and
praxis either as an invention strategy (students' talking with peers in review sessions and with teachers in conferences), a proofreading strategy
(students' reading papers aloud to check sentence flow), or as an influential metaphor (voice). As a result of these pairings, our field's dominant
tropes for interpretive invention have been writing and reading and
speaking. I am inviting us to consider rhetorical listening as another effective trope for interpretive invention.
A second disciplinarybias that explains our neglect of listening is that
Western rhetoricaltheories themselves have traditionallyslighted listening.
Classicaltheories foreground the rhetor's speaking and writing as means of
persuading audiences; these theories are only secondarily concerned with
how audiences should listen and hardly at all concerned with what
Michelle Ballif calls the desires of particular audience members. Granted,
Aristotle's Rhetoricassures students who study his rhetorical theory that
they will learn not only how to produceenthymemes but also how to analyze
them (I. 12), and in a culture whose texts were primarilyoral, such analysis
implies listening. But Aristotle's theory never delves into how to listen.
Moreover, his production/reception linkage is more complicated than his
assurance allows. Although most writing teachers and students link production (writing) with reception (reading), they also recognize differencesmost students are more comfortable with reading than with writing. And
although writing teachers and students may link strategies of production
(speaking with writing) and strategiesof reception (readingwith listening),
they ascertain differences here too: speaking is second "nature"for most
students, but writing is not; some students learn better by reading information, others by hearing it explained. Yet classical and modern theories of
rhetoric rarely delineate or question such production/reception differences.
Although poststructuralisttheory calls such differences into question, it
inadvertently serves as a third disciplinary bias in our field's neglect of
listening. Jacques Derrida's project to deconstruct Western metaphysics
reverses Plato's celebration of speaking and suspicion of writing. Consequently, deconstruction champions writing as a trope that more accurately
describes how we use language and how language uses us; moreover, it
collapses reading into this equation by arguing that writing is reading is
writing. But because it denigrates speaking as the trope that fosters a
metaphysics of presence, poststructuralist theory in the wake of Derrida
finds itself suspicious of speaking and, by association, of listening, even
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though Derridapays tribute to listening as a means of substituting the ethical for the ideal in his essay about Emmanuel Levinas (Derrida99).
One cultural bias that may partially account for our field's neglect of listening is exposed in the work of Deborah Tannen. Citing personal observation, other researchers' case studies, and her own linguistic theory,
Tannen claims that in our culture speaking is gendered as masculine and
valued positively in a public forum while listening is gendered as feminine
and valued negatively. Tannen further argues that our culture socializes
men and women to listen differently: men often listen by challenging
speakers to a verbal duel to determine who knows more and who is quicker on his feet; women often listen by smiling, nodding, asking questions
and providing encouraging verbal cues (yes, uh huh, is that right?, hmmm)

(142). In other words, men are socialized to play the listening game via the
questions "'Have I won?'" and "'Do you respect me?'" while women are
socialized to play it via the questions "'Have I been helpful?'" and "'Do
you like me?'" (129). Thus gendered, listening subordinates not only
women to men but listening to speaking.
Another cultural bias that may inform our neglect of listening emerges
in the writings of Nikki Giovanni, who argues that listening is not only
gendered but informed by ethnicity. Specifically, Giovanni argues that listening is not as necessary in our culture for white people as it is for people
of color; she also argues that this general trend can be complicated by class
differences. To illustrate her point, Giovanni imagines a fictional scenario,
a poet's internal dialogue with herself while composing a talk for the
372nd Annual Convention of Black and White Women in America:
I suppose we shouldn't even talk about how the women's movement
wouldn'tlisten to the Blackwomen when we triedto say that the average
white woman didn'tunderstandher maid.I mean, [in the movie An ImitationofLife]when LanaTurnersaidto Annie,"Ididn'tknow you belongedto
a lodge,"JuanitaMoorereplied,"Well,MissLaura[sic],you never asked."
Therewas no women'smovement;there was a white women'smovement
and Blackwomen never were, nor felt, included.It'sall been an imitation
of
lifeto us, and thelongwalkhomewon't changethat. (85-86)
Giovanni points out that Lana Turner'sLora Meredith wears the blinders
that privilege affords privileged people, in this case the blinders that white
privilege affords white people. Despite the fact that Annie is privy to the
intimate details of Lora'slife, Lora has not imagined her maid's life, Annie
Johnson's life, beyond the services visibly rendered in their apartment.
One question that may be asked of this scenario is: how may Lora change
her complicity in the structural and personal racism that haunts all their
lives if she cannot see it?

Ratcliffe/Rhetorical
Listening

201

This question exposes a third cultural bias that may have influenced
our field's neglect of listening-our culture's privileging of sight, our preference for interpretive tropes that proceed via the eye, what Martin Jay
calls ocularcentrism.6The question that emerges is: what are the limits of
ocularcentrism? As any camera operator will confirm, the limitation of
sight is that when one object is foregrounded, other objects blur, fade into
the background, fall outside the field of vision. To carry this metaphor further, I believe that the sight tropes of reading and writing may sometimes
perpetuate our difficulty of bringing into focus two differences, such as
gender and ethnicity. Adrienne Rich admits the difficulty of such a move,
even as she exhorts us to "watchthe edges that blur" ("Contradictions"29):
SometimesI feel I have seen too long fromtoo many disconnectedangles:
white, Jewish,anti-Semite,racist,anti-racist,once-marriedlesbian,middleclass, feminist,exmatriatesoutherner,split at the root-that I will never
bringthem whole.
I would have liked,in this essay,to bringtogetherthe meaningsof antiSemitismand racismas I have experiencedthem and as I believethey intersectin the worldbeyondmy life.ButI'mnot ableto do thisyet. ("Splitat the
Root" 122).

This difficulty is exemplified in Lora and Annie's situation: Lora does not
understand Annie because the cultural "blinders"of white and class privilege impede Lora's ability to "visualize"Annie's life beyond how it "visibly" intersects with her own. And I believe this difficulty, in one way or
another, haunts all our lives. Despite this difficulty, Rich admonishes us to
keep trying to understand by bringing blurred intersections together and
then acting accordingly: "we can't wait to speak until we are perfectly
clear and righteous. There is no purity and, in our lifetime, no end to this
process" (123). So for those times when we run into difficulty with blurred
intersections, I suggest we switch from a sight trope to an auditory one
and see, or rather listen to, where it may lead.
Why Listening? or What the Ear Has to Offer
Before offering an extended definition of rhetorical listening, I feel compelled to carve out a space for listening. For of all the questions that have
haunted this project, one keeps coming back to me from reviewers and
audience members: How does listening differ from reading? When I presented a version of this article at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee's
Rhetoric and Composition Lecture Series, a graduate student responded,
prefacing her remarks with, "Ofcourse, what you're really talking about is
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a kind of reading." No, I tried to explain, I am not. I am talking about interpretive invention, a way of making meaning with/in language, with
two different kinds being reading and listening. For if listening is to be revived and revalued in our field, it must occupy its own niche. Rather than
be subsumed by reading, it should rank as an equal yet intertwining process of interpretive invention, for sometimes the ear can help us see just as
the eye can help us hear.7 But I am not surprised at the graduate student's
response. It is informed not only by the disciplinary and cultural biases
previously mentioned but also by what I believe is the organizing principle
of these biases: the divided logosthat Martin Heidegger claims we have inherited in the west, the logosthat speaks but does not listen.
One need not fully subscribe to Heidegger's philosophical project of
dasein, or being in the world, to recognize the aptness of his divided logos
theory. In general, the logosis a system of discourse within which a culture reasons and derives its truths. Although the Greeks had different
concepts of logos (Jarratt 42-61), Heidegger argues that these concepts
imply both speaking and listening. He further argues that "this nature of
language remains hidden from the Greeks. They have never expressedly
stressed it, much less raised it to the level of a problem. But their statements operate in this realm" (What202). To explain his claim, Heidegger
explores the relationship between the Greek noun logosand its verb form
legein,which in its fullest sense means both "saying"and "laying" (198).
The second meaning, "laying,"entails laying others' ideas in front of us in
order to let these ideas lie before us. This laying-to-let-lie-before-us functions as a preservation of others' ideas (194-215) and, hence, as a site for
listening.
But because we have inherited a divided logos, we inhabit a culture
where "saying"has assumed dominance and "laying" (and, thus, listening) has been displaced. Thus separated from a consideration of otherness,
"saying"quickly becomes masterly expression; writing, a means of masterly expression; and reading, a means of mastering-the-masterly-expression.
And all three quickly subsume listening. But listening is not totally erased,
just displaced...and almost always diminished from its potential as legein.
Sometimes it is acknowledged because it cannot be physically ignored, as
in the fields of psychology, theology, and communications. Sometimes it is
assumed to be a natural process that we need not study, as in composition
studies. Sometimes it is mistaken for silence, as in patriarchal histories of
women and non-dominant ethnic groups. And sometimes it goes by another name: reading, as when we read for tone, rhythm, voice, silence and
a plethora of other elements associated with a h(ear)ring metaphor.8
In The OtherSide of Language:A Philosophyof Listening,Gemma Corradi
Fiumara calls for both a reinterpretation of our logosto expose its divided
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nature and a restoration of a fuller logosbased on the Greek action legein
(11-17). Such reinterpretations and restorations would result in a philosophy of listening, which would offer us other codes for conducting ourselves in the world. For as Fiumara suggests, a philosophy of listening "is
an attempt to retrieve the functions of listening which may allow for truer
forms of dialogue" (13). That is, in a divided logos(one that speaks but does
not listen), we commonly employ dialogue as Hegelian dialectic wherein
the posited thesis subsumes the acceptable aspects of the antithesis with
the unacceptable excess being exiled from the dominant logic. In an undivided logos(one that speaks and listens), we would employ dialogue as a
dialectic-that-questions-dialectic, enabling a metonymic coexistence of
ideas (Fiumara 15, 17).
Thus, I would like to echo Fiumara'scall for listening by issuing a similar one in composition studies. For just as all texts can be read, so too can
all texts be listened to. As a trope for interpretive invention, rhetorical listening differs from reading in that it proceeds via different body organs,
different disciplinary and cultural assumptions, and different figures of
speech. And as Fiumara suggests, listening maps out an entirely different
space in which to relate to discourse: we may become "apprenticesof listening rather than masters of discourse" (57). For when listening within
an undivided logos, we do not read simply for what we can agree with or
challenge, as is the habit of academic reading (in its multiple guises). Instead, we choose to listen also for the exiled excess and contemplate its relation to our culture and our selves. Such listening does not presume a
naive, relativisticempathy, such as "I'mOK, You're OK,"but rather an ethical responsibility to argue for what we deem fair and just while simultaneously questioning that which we deem fair and just. Such listening, I
argue, may help us invent, interpret, and ultimately judge differently in
that perhaps we can hear things we cannot see. In this more inclusive logos
lies a potential for personal and social justice.
Hence, rhetorical listening as a trope for interpretive invention has the
potential to function productively as a code of cross-cultural conduct.
Perhaps through listening we can avail ourselves with more possibilities
for inventing arguments that bring differences together, for hearing differences as harmony or even as discordant notes (in which case, at least,
differences are discernible). Admittedly, we cannot hear everything at
once (the din would no doubt madden us), yet we can listen to the harmony and/or discordant notes, knowing that more than meets the eye
lies before us.
Obviously I am not arguing that we abandon reading, writing, and
speaking. I am, however, suggesting that we recognize their limits and rethink them within an undivided logos,one that includes listening.
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Rhetorical Listening as a Trope for Interpretive Invention,
or How to "Break the Back of Words"
An example of rhetorical listening emerges in Marge Piercy's poem, "The
Book of Ruth and Naomi." Even though Ruth and Naomi are born into
different ethnic groups (Ruth is Moabite; Naomi, Judean),9 they forge a
relationship that, for centuries, has represented an ideal friendship between women. Piercy attributes the success of their relationship, in part,
to each woman's desire to whisper:
Showme a womanwho does not dream
a double,heart'stwin, a sister
of the mindin whose earshe can whisper.(277)
Yet this desire to whisper is predicated on the already existing possibility of
another woman, one whose ear may hear the whisper, one who
listens...and understands. Yet despite the fact that listening is a necessary
component of these women's relationship, listening is backgrounded in
this poem, in its Biblical source, in much of our cultural consciousness
and, as I have already argued, in composition studies.
To foreground listening in our field, I offer rhetorical listening as a trope
for interpretive invention, one that emerges from a space within the logos
where listeners may employ their agency-which Stanford drama theorist
Alice Rayner defines as both "capacity"and willingness (7)-to situate
themselves openly in relation to all kinds of discourse, whether written,
oral, or imagistic. The rhetorical listening that I am promoting is a performance that occurs when listeners invoke both their capacity and their willingness (1) to promote an understandingof self and other that informs our
culture's politics and ethics, (2) to proceed from within a responsibility
logic,
not from within a defensive guilt/blame one, (3) to locate identification in
discursive spaces of both commonalities
and (4) to accentuate
and differences,
commonalities and differences not only in claimsbut in culturallogicswithin
which those claims function. As such, rhetorical listening enables us to
hear textual strategies associated with a h(ear)ing metaphor, such as voice
and silence; relatedly but more encompassingly, it enables us to hear what
Toni Morrison calls "the sound that [breaks] the back of words" (Beloved
261), thus enabling us to question the logosas we know it. What follows is
an explanation of the above definition, an explanation indebted to Phelan
and Lunsford,to Vitanzaand Heidegger,and to Rayner and Morrison.
By employing understandingas an end of rhetorical listening, I recognize
that I am invoking a troubled term. Understanding
has a complicated history in narrative studies and in philosophical studies in that it is often coupled with authorial intent.10 And as many scholars caution, this coupling
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often gives birth to a naive idealism. For example, Julia Kristeva claims
that because Westerners "are entitled only to the ear of the virginal body
[of Mary]...., there arises a possible tendency to eroticize [and, hence, idealize] hearing, voice or even understanding" (173). And Steven Mailloux
claims that coupling understanding and intent often circles "backto all the
problems of textual realism and readerly idealism and ignores the specific
rhetorical contexts of power-knowledge" (148). By posing understanding
as an end of rhetorical listening, I am not proposing that we idealize understanding or authorial intent: my purpose is neither to promote a "textual realism"wherein a text is perceived as a repository of the truth nor to
celebrate a naive "readerly idealism" wherein the contexts of speaker/
writers are simplified and the contexts of reader/listeners erased. Rather,
my purpose is to wed Giovanni's real to Piercy'sideal, to collapse the real/
ideal dichotomy into a third ground where rhetorical negotiation is exposed as always already existing and where rhetorical listening is posited
as one means of that negotiation.
Granted, such a purpose resonates with remnants of idealism. But I like
to consider them strategic. Just as Gayatri Spivak justifies subalterns' employing a "strategicessentialism" in their critique of post-colonial oppression (205), and just as Amy Schuman justifies ethnographers' employing a
"strategicRomanticism" when constructing and analyzing the subjects of
their studies, I am advocating a strategic idealism when listening with the
intent to understand. Strategic idealism implies a conscious identification
among people that is based on a desire for an intersubjective receptivity,
not mastery, and on a simultaneous recognition of similarities and differences, not merely one or the other. The idealism is strategic in that we
should recognize the difficulty and dangers inherent in such a project...
and proceed knowingly.
As I employ it, then, understanding
means more than simply listening for
a speaker/writer'sintent. It also means more than simply listening for our
own self-interestedintent, which may range from appropriation(employing
a text for one's own ends), to Burkean identification (smoothing over differences), to agreement (only affirmingone's own view of reality). Instead, understandingmeans listening to discourse not for intent but with intent-with
the intent to understand not just the claims, not just the cultural logics
within which the claims function, but the rhetorical negotiations of understanding as well. To clarify this process of understanding, we might best
invert the term and define understandingas standing under-consciously
standing under discourses that surround us and others, while consciously
acknowledging all our particular and fluid standpoints. Standing under
discourses means letting discourses wash over, through, and around us
and then letting them lie there to inform our politics and ethics.
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Standing under our own discourses means identifying the various discourses embodied in each of us and then listening to hear and imagine
how they might affect not only ourselves but others. The question that
arises, of course, is the same dilemma that haunts LoraMeredith: How can
we know what is so naturalized for us that it is no longer visible to us? As
one answer to that question, at least in terms of theater performances, Alice Rayner offers listening. In many ways, her claim echoes Hans-Georg
Gadamer'sbelief that "the primacy of hearing is the basis of the hermeneutical phenomenon" (420): that is, we speak because someone is listening. If we pull Rayner's theory into composition studies, we may argue
that those of us listening to our own discourses return our discourses to
ourselves somehow unchanged but changed. To exemplify this process,
Rayner points to VirginiaWoolf, who writes of a longing to hear the echo
of her own words. Rayner deems Woolf's desire as
the need for a return(echo) of speechand gesture,a returnthat occursin
time as openness,not in a staticimageor closedmeaning.The echo is lifegivingbecausewhile it is rootedin the past,it is not fixedby the past.It returnsthe voice to the speaker,the samebut different.(21).
Because our returning discourses may look the same but resonate differently, we need to cultivate both our eyes and our ears.
Standing under the discourses of others means first acknowledging the
existence of these discourses; second, listening for the (un)conscious presences, absences, unknowns; and third, consciously integrating this information into our world-views and decision-making. The question that
arises here is: how may we listen for that which we do not intellectually,
viscerally, or experientially know? Or as Pocahontas sings to John Smith
in that travesty of a Disney movie, how will you "learn things you never
knew you never knew?" Again Rayner provides a way of thinking about
this issue that may be borrowed for composition, a way of thinking that
heeds Heidegger's reminder that in addition to silence, hearing is also a
possibility of discursive speech ("Phenomenology" 234). Rayner argues
that a theater audience (not as a collective whole but as a collection of individuals) should listen to a performance, perceiving it "not as a referential
intention but as a desire to be heard as meaningful or as meaningfully
breaking the conventional frames. The emphasis...is on the attempt and
effort, not success or failure" (18), at least not as defined by dominant social conventions. This "desire to be heard" echoes not simply as a conscious use of a discourse but also as all the unconscious, socializing
functions of a discourse. If we meet this "desireto be heard" with counterdesires-pretending the desire to be heard does not exist, hoping it will
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disappear, or waiting for someone else to handle it-we stymie potential
dialogue. But by standing under the discourses of others and rhetorically
listening to them, we may transpose a desire for mastery into a self-conscious desire for receptivity; this process both invites the desires of others
into our consciousness and accords these desires a place in which to be
heard (Rayner 18).
Standing under discourses does not guarantee agreement; it should not
guarantee idealization; it does, however, offer the possibility of hearing
what we cannot see. In this process the unknown becomes not a perpetually purloined letter-"an irretrievable absence or gap which symbols replace and displace, as in the Lacanian formula," but rather and "more
simply and more radically a limit to understanding" (Rayner 14). Limits
may be moved and re/moved. According to Rayner, the agency for moving
and re/moving such limits involves a "capacity"and a willingness (7): listeners possess that capacity and what we must supply is the willingness.
This focus on willingness, on conscious action, on listening does not deny
the socializing power of discourse on people's unconscious. Rather, it simply articulates the space within which we may interject our own agencies,
albeit partial and complicated, into our own socializations.
The goal of understanding is a broader cultural literacy within which
we may negotiate our daily attitudes and actions, our politics and our ethics. Rayner provides theater-goers with a definition of one such literacy, a
definition that might be applied more generally to composition studies via
rhetorical listening:
It is perhapsa borderlandmore than a boundarybetween the capacityto
hearandthe obligationto listento what one cannotimmediatelyunderstand
or comprehend.Andit leadsto the learningof community...inthe exchange
of signs.... At the veryleast,suchchoiceinvolvesa decisionto recognizeand
becomeself-conscioustowardthe limitationsof [one's]own 'imaginary'
version of self and other-a limitationthatdoes not acquiesceto...an unknowable, but takesthat unknowableas a pre-conditionwithin which actionis
stillnecessaryand a confrontationwith anotherinevitable.(18-19)
Even if-and perhaps because-confrontation is inevitable, this literacy
has the potential to effect more productive discourses about, and across,
differences and commonalities. Acquiring such literacy is both a political
and ethical issue for people wielding power and for people lacking it.
Positing political action as another end of rhetorical listening foregrounds the realm where rhetoric intersects ethics. This connection may
be easily discerned but not so easily acted upon. That is, we may not always choose or control the discourses that socialize us; neither may we
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choose or control our unconscious responses to them. But once we consciously articulate our socializations and choose to respond to them, we
become responsible for our words, our attitudes, our actions. And because
it is through words, attitudes, and actions that we negotiate our conventional truths as well as our behaviors based upon these truths, Diane Davis
argues that:
Whatis needed now is an ethicsof decision;to the extent that we may no
longersimplybe guidedby ontologicalTruth,by lightor logos,decisionshave
to be made.And any ethicsof decisionnecessitatesfirsta "hearing"-double
entendre
intended:it necessitatesboth a listeningand a judging.
Rayner agrees, claiming that listening as presence and as judgment presumes "an ethics of relation not simply power over" (21). That difference
is the mediation of discourse through the listener, whether other or selfas-other. In this way, the other becomes a necessaryconsideration in the
making of meaning for both the speaker/writer and the listener." Thus,
rhetorical listening opens up not only possibilities, but responsibilities, for
interpretive invention, for making meanings via language via others. Although rhetorical listening does not guarantee that everyone will concur
about definitions, intersections, and applications of the political and the
ethical, it does guarantee that such considerations will be at the forefront
of meaning-making.
By championing a responsibility logic, not a guilt/blame one, rhetorical
listening offers us the possibility of getting past the guilt/blame tropes of
accusation, denial, and defensiveness-all of which are associated with authorial intent and all of which usually result in a stalemate that preserves
the status quo. By championing a responsibility logic, rhetorical listening
asks us, first, to judge not simply the person's intent but the historically situated discourses that are (un)consciously swirling around and through the
person and, second, to evaluate politically and ethically how these discourses function and how we want to act upon them.
By locating identification in discursive spaces of commonalities and differences, rhetorical listening juxtaposes traditional and postmodern rhetorical concerns. Traditionaltheories of rhetoric celebrate commonality, a
metaphoric common ground, a Burkean sharing of substance, as the place
of identification and, hence, of persuasion (Rhetoric55). Postmodern theories of discourse question the possibility of substance and common ground
and, instead, champion a metonymic juxtaposition of differences as the
place of identification (Fuss 3; Butler 93-121). The problem with traditional identification is that differences are often glossed over or erased, left
outside the circle of consubstantiality;the problem with postmodern iden-
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tification is that commonalities are often perceived as impossible or as impossibly naive. Rhetorical listening interrupts this binary opposition by
positing both commonalities and differences as possible metonymic places
for rhetorical exchanges. In these places, discourses (not substances) converge and diverge. In these places, dialogue emerges as a dialectical conversation that questions the process of dialectic, a conversation that "seeks
not the clarificationand rigidification of difference [or commonalities] but
rather the murky margins between, those margins of overlap which inaugurate and which limit the very functioning of dialectic" (Williams 218).
Within such borderlands, rhetorical listening helps us to analyze such convergences and divergences. This analysis, in turn, helps us to articulate our
socialization and also to communicate about-and across-both differences and commonalities.
By focusing on the differences and commonalities within textual claims
and their cultural logics, rhetorical listening ties the personal (the claim) to
the political (the cultural logic) without totally collapsing differences between the two. Although both claims and cultural logics are rhetorical constructs, our arguments and our analyses of arguments too often focus only
on claims: "I'm right." vs. "No, you're not." If we recognize not just the
claims but the historically-grounded cultural logics enveloping other people's claims, we may still disagree with the claims, but we may better understand the personal and cultural assumptions (dare I say, values and
beliefs) that guide other people's logics. And if we also recognize how
claims and cultural logics are rhetorically constructed, we may better appreciate the reasoning powers of others even when we disagree with them.
While there are obvious benefits of rhetorical listening, there are also
caveats. First, listening with the intent to receive, not master, discourses is
not a quick fix or a happy-ever-after solution; rather, it is an on-going process. It will not result in an ideal world in which listening, or rhetorical negotiation, is no longer necessary. Such hopes are not only naive but
dangerous. Instead rhetorical listening is another way of helping us continually negotiate our always evolving standpoints, our identities, with the
always evolving standpoints of others. It is also another way of helping us
recognize that our standpoints are not autonomous points of static stases
but rather complex webs of dynamically intermingled cultural structures
and subjective agency.
Second, although listening with the intent to receive, not master, discourses can motivate a particular listener to take political/ethical action,
this listener's desire cannot control how other readers, writers, speakers,
and listeners will, in turn, receive her desire, her discourse, her actions.
One should certainly not expect a pat on the back either for rhetorical listening or for speaking, reading, or writing based on rhetorical listening.
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After all, rhetorical listening is the responsibility of everyone. Expectations
to the contrary are not only insulting but reduce rhetorical listening to
simple intent.
And third, as Marquette undergraduate Sara Scheunemann articulates:
"Listening with the intent to understand opens [us] up...to being challenged, convicted, and hurt by the truth." It may be more another's truth
than the truth that hurts us; however, this challenge, this conviction, this
hurt exposes a space of dissonance. When responding to this dissonance,
we should not accuse the person foregrounding it, deny its existence, nor
bristle defensively. Such reactions only shut down dialogue and reinforce
the status quo. Rather, we should question ourselves-our attitudes and
our actions-to determine whether we need to affirm, revise, or reject
them. If such questioning makes us more uncomfortable, so be it. In fact,
good. Such discomfort simply signifies already existing problems and underscores the need for standing under the discourses of ourselves and
others-and listening.
One Use, or Rhetorical Listening as a Code of Cross-Cultural Conduct
If rhetorical listening functions, generally, as a trope for interpretive invention, it may also be specifically employed in innumerable ways. But,
again, I am most interested in its potential as "a code of cross-cultural conduct." Its potential lies in the fact that listening not only signifies respect
but also asks listeners to acknowledge, to cultivate, and to negotiate conventions of different discourse communities. As a code of cross-cultural
conduct, rhetorical listening may further our understanding of gender and
ethnicity intersections in ways that may promote cross-cultural dialogues
on any number of topics.
To exemplify why our articulations of gender and ethnicity intersections must include whiteness, let me revisit a thread in my thinking about
rhetorical listening. When I mentioned earlier that Susan Jarratt challenged me to consider how race complicated my book project on AngloAmerican feminist theories of rhetoric, what I did not tell you was this:
Writing about Woolf's, Daly's, and Rich's race/ethnicity claims was fairly
easy, but writing about how whiteness hovers around these women's discussions of women, language, and culture was hard.
What complicated my musing at that moment was my own standpoint
as a white feminist who had an abhorrence of racism and who had considered how racism works in the lives of people of color but who had never
really been taught, nor had taken it upon herself to learn, how racism
functions in relation to whiteness and/or white people. Jarratt'schallenge
to acknowledge race in my book project afforded me such an opportunity.
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But when I began thinking about whiteness, I found myself echoing the
claims of Adrienne Rich ("Split"122), Ruth Frankenberg ("When We Are
Capable"11), and Becky Thompson ("TimeTraveling"95): Nothing in my
education, academic or otherwise, had prepared me to recognize (see) or
articulate (say) whiteness in myself or others, and certainly nothing in my
education had provided me with strategies for resisting certain versions of
my whiteness that may privilege me but not others.
So I decided to find strategiesfor conceptualizingand articulatingwhiteness. I reasoned that if I could not see the way whiteness worked, perhaps I
could hearit. Thus, I came to link rhetoricallistening with articulatinggender and ethnicity concerns, particularlygendered constructions of whiteness. The question that emerged next, of course, was: What should I listen
to? Given my thinking about rhetorical listening, the obvious answer was:
to the discourses of myself and others. For my purposes, I settled on three
types: autoethnography,academic research, and the stories of others.
My interest in listening to autoethnography'2 initially emerged from a
fascinating discussion that suddenly erupted a few years ago in my undergraduate rhetorical theory class. In response to Cornel West's RaceMatters,
an exasperated white student told the class, "I don't see what the big deal
is. I don't wake up every morning, look in the mirror, and say, 'Hey, I'm a
white man.'" I paused for a moment, letting the tension in the room build,
and then I asked him, "Do you think that is West's point? That you don't
have to think about race but he does?" What followed was the longest silence and then the most lively debate I have ever encountered in an undergraduate classroom, a debate about gender, race, and ethnicity that still
echoes in my ears.
When I listen rhetorically to the textual strategies associated with a
h(ear)ing metaphor in this exchange, I hear echoes of multiple voices: I
hear the young man's tone of authority and frustration along with an underlying defensiveness (he seemed to think he was expected to keep quiet
about such ideas); I hear the cultural voice of a white America that imagines itself racially unmarked; I hear the silence of the classroom, of students not knowing whether and/or how to speak; and I also hear my
teacherly tone, questioning yet subsuming the young man's thinking back
into West's. Such listening creates a space in which it becomes possible to
question the logosas it plays out in myself, in the students, and in our culture. For example, would I have modelled a better listening technique if I
had asked the class a less slanted question, such as "What happens when
we lay this response alongside West's text?" And, how implicated am I in
the fact that students felt they had few strategies for talking about gender
and ethnicity, particularlywhiteness? And, how often do I actually create
pedagogical spaces that encourage such discussions? And, how frequently
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am I just as dismissive of how my own racial markings complicate my behavior, gendered or otherwise? And, why is white America so vested in
being racially unmarked? Without this opportunity for listening, the
young man and those who agreed with his ideas would never have been
challenged, nor would have those students who whole-heartedly agreed
with West, nor would have I.
This young man reminded me of an important lesson: we learn by listening to those who do not agree with us, provided the listening occurs in
the context of "genuine conversation" (Copeland), where there is a desire
in all parties to move our understanding forward. If the context is not one
of genuine conversation, then refusing to listen may be appropriate. The
trick is recognizing the differences as well as the possibilities for transforming the latter into the former. As a result of this young man's comments, I
now try to see beyond my own reflection by listening to the discourses
surrounding me in order to ask myself how being a white woman affects
my being in the world. In this way, I try to bring bits of my own embodied
sexism and racism to consciousness and become responsible for dealing
with them one question at a time.
Though valuable, autoethnography is admittedly limited in perspective.
So to explore whiteness further, I decided to listen to academic research.
Instead of reading to master the knowledge or to find a point of agreement
and/or attack, I listened to studies of whiteness, laying them alongside my
own lack of knowing. I wanted to understand how whiteness functions
within our contemporary cultural matrix, specifically in the U.S., and how
it is inscribed differently within all of us. The following are just a few ideas
I uncovered.
Like all cultural categories, whiteness is a trope, a category, a social construct that we employ to name people and practices. Yet a "conditional"
relationship exists between white people and white practices in that not
everyone can be classified as a white person but everyone can perform
white practices, albeit with varying degrees of success (Keating 907). Although whiteness (like all cultural categories) is historically grounded
(changing over time and space) and multiple (including lots of subcategories), in the U.S. it has consistently signified "privilege";as such, it has resisted and denied difference (Frankenberg, Social 236-37). While this
privilege of whiteness has been translated into great achievements for
some, it has also been translated into "dominance,"even violence, for others. Functioning as a cultural norm (Hill 1; Dyer 2; Keating 904), whiteness
and its privileges are often invisible to white people yet very visible to people of color. Although impossible to understand apart from its intersections
with gender, class, sexual orientation, age, etc. (Thompson 94), whiteness
is often a missing ground in our cultural conversations even as it appears
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in census reportsand college applicationforms. PerhapsAnnLouise Keating
says it best: whiteness "-whatever it is, and I would argue that at this point
no one really knows-" is slippery (916).
When I listen rhetorically to this research, I also hear competing cultural logics: the status quo (which ignores whiteness) and the above critics
(which promote whiteness studies). Further, I hear differences among the
latter. I hear a tone of adamant authority in Frankenberg,an attempt to legitimize the study of whiteness within academic discourses by arguing that
we must foreground this often invisible ground of our cultural discussions."3I also hear a more tentative authority in Keating, a care taken with
words such as "conditional"and "whateverit is" in recognition of both the
values and dangers of studying whiteness. For despite the fact that whiteness studies has become a highly touted research area in literary studies,
sociology, history, art, film studies, anthropology, etc., even proponents of
whiteness studies voice concerns. Some feminist scholars question the
study of whiteness, fearing it may be a politically conservative move in
that it returns discussions once again to white people, especially white
men, (Hill, "Introduction"4-8), and some ethnicity scholars question such
study, fearing as Michael Eric Dyson says, it may be "a sneaky form of
narcissism... [that shifts] the focus and maybe even the resources back to
white people and their perspectives (qtd. in Talbot 118). Others fear that
studying whiteness risks reifying and perpetuating false categories of race
(Keating 913). Listening to this research to question the logosinvites me to
consider the (im)possibilities of studying whiteness: it will not solve all
discord; indeed, it may incite more. But it may also help us imagine better ways of articulating the political/ethical permutations of gender and
ethnicity-and the ways they are rhetorically constructed and negotiated.
Listening to this research also makes me aware of the strategic idealism
underlying such a claim.
By listening to autoethnography and academic research, I can test one
against the other. But this juxtaposition also has its limits. Although both
are useful means for understanding how gender and ethnicity merge in our
culture, these means should not be used or taught unreflectively, nor
should they be the only modes of critical thinking that we pass on to our
students. For although autoethnography is becoming more common (just
note the number of 1998 CCCCpreconvention workshops on the topic), it
risks lapsing into a narcissisticconfessional solipsism-and a privileged one
at thatl4-unless we tie the personal to the cultural in ways that expose
how our experiences speak metonymically for larger cultural issues and
unless we make such storytelling a viable option for all academicians, not
simply a select few. Moreover, for those of us trained in the academy, scholarly research too often resembles Tannen'sdefinition of men listening: that
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is, let's duel verbally or in writing so that I can prove how much I know
and, hence, you'll respect me.15
Consequently, we need to listen and offer students the opportunities to
listen to the stories of others-all others. This realization echoes bell
hooks' claim: "I have gone back to 'confession' not as a need to tell my
own story in public or to be narcissistic, but because I now realize that
people really learn from the sharing of experience" (Childers and hooks
77). Such learning occurs not only when we listen to the claims in other
people's stories but also when we listen to their cultural logics, or rather
the competing cultural logics that such stories expose.
To understand how whiteness is inscribed within white bodies,'6 we
need to listen to stories such as Lillian Smith's reflections on her childhood
in Killersof theDream:
The mother who taught me what I know of tenderness and love and compassion taught me also the bleak rituals of keeping Negroes in their "place."
The father who rebuked me for an air of superiority toward schoolmates
from the mill and rounded out his rebuke by gravely reminding me that "all
men are brothers,"trained me in the steel-rigid decorums I must demand of
every colored male. They who so gravely taught me to split my body from
my mind and both from my "soul," taught me also to split my conscience
from my acts and Christianityfrom southern tradition. (27)
If I listen to the strategies in this text, I hear the contradictory sounds and

rhythms in the first sentence: the mellifluous vowels in "tenderness and
love and compassion"juxtaposed with the harsh consonants of "bleakrituals of keeping Negroes in their 'place.'" I also discern voices of competing

cultural logics: the status quo vs. social activism. By teaching Smith to
"split" the inscriptions of gender, class, sex, religion, regional tradition,
that are interwoven within her young body, Smith's parents un/consciously perpetuate what Rich calls "white discourse" ("Distance" 182),
wherein whiteness is a privileged norm split from other cultural categories
in ways that render it invisible, hiding its violence behind parlor manners
and polite language. By listening to question the logos,I have to ask myself
if and how this version of white discourse is still being played out in my
own life and culture, masked by middle class manners.
To understand how whiteness is inscribed within non-white bodies but
in ways that preclude these bodies from fully participatingin the privileges
of whiteness, we need to listen to stories like Jeanne Wakatsuki Houston's

in FarewelltoManzanar.In her reflections on her family's life at Manzanar,
a World War II Japanese-American internment camp, she remembers a
story about her brother:
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"[m]y oldest brother, Bill, led a dance band called The Jive Bombers.... He
didn't sing Don'tFenceMeIn out of protest, as if trying quietly to mock the authorities. It just happened to be a hit song one year, and they all wanted to be
an up-to-date American swing band....
Oh, give me land lots of land
Under starry skies above,
Don't fence me in.
Let me ride through the wide
Open country that I love (73-74)
Listening to the textual strategies, I hear Wakatsuki Houston's disclaiming
sisterly tone, denying any political intent on her brother's part; I also hear
her more savvy writerly tone, using this "nonpolitical" incident to expose
the political intent of white America as well its taken-for-granted privileges, like roaming. Though Bill desires to be non-political, his body is politicized, marked simultaneously by his Japanese ancestry and by his desire to
be all-American. In the textual moment of Wakatsuki Houston's reflec-

tions, I hear competing cultural logics of the Manzanar camp culture and
the dominant white culture. From her perspective as a once wrongfully
interned American citizen, she hears "Don't Fence Me In" very differently
from how most white America heard it at the time of its release or from
how most Americans hear it today in Embassy Suite commercials. For her,
the role of the masculinized roamer rings falsely from the mouth of Bill, a
young American imprisoned solely because his ancestry differed from the

cultural norm.17 So while his desire to be all-American functions as a
metonym for the white discourse of his time, the ancestry classifications
within that white discourse preclude his full participation in the privileges
of whiteness and, hence, the fulfillment of his desire. Indeed, within 1940s
white culture, Bill's ethnicity trumps his gender even as his gender privileges him within the Manzanar camp. Listening to this passage in order to
question the logos, I not only question the fairness and legality of Jeanne's

and Bill's situations, but I also have to ask myself, once again, if and how I
ever participatein white discourses in ways that might unknowingly erase
the desires and material existence of others?

A Pedagogical Instance, or Listening to a Student's Listening
To illustrate how rhetorical listening plays out pedagogically, let me share
an experience I had with a white student named Rachel Weber. For while
Rachel was writing her second paper for our women's literature course,
she put rhetorical listening into action as a trope for interpretive invention
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and as a code of cross-cultural conduct. By listening to her listening, I was
able to pull together the threads in my definition. During one class session
we read aloud from Toni Morrison's Beloved,specifically the first telling of
the shed scene where the escaped slave Sethe attempts to kill her children
and herself before her former owner Schoolteacher can recapture them
all. Narrated from four white men's points of view, this scene perfectly
captures how white slaveholders justify slavery: they liken slaves to animals and, consequently, deem beatings not inhumane, merely nonproductive. After our class discussion, Rachel emailed me about a possible paper
topic, one that would relate our class discussion to a guest lecture in her
political science class, which she had attended earlier in the day.
Hi! Something "strange"just occurred, and I was wondering if I could
bounce it off you because the oddity of the situation just intrigues me, and I
can't quite see how to put it into perspective, so I'm hoping you can help.
(Quite a sentence!) First off, we just finished with class, and for you to understand the story, you have to know that I have Dr. [X's] Corrections class
right before yours. (I'm a Poli Sci and Crim major.)
Okay, well today in that class, we had a guest speaker.... Now the man
was entertaining and informative, and I enjoyed the class and his lecture immensely (one of those people who appear so energized you can't help but
wonder how much coffee they drink in a single day--but still, they are fun
to listen to as energy is infectious). Now to the point...He started his lecture
by asking how many people believed in parole and whether it was a good
thing or not. The class was overwhelmingly against it (typical), and the overall opinion was that it was kind of a necessary evil (due to overcrowding,
etc.). Well, to give us an example of one main reason parole and institutions
like it were a necessity, he told a metaphor. The metaphor was one about a
mean dog in the neighborhood who gets into trouble. If you chain the dog
up and keep it on a short leash and punish it for it's [sic] wrongs, you are
only causing the dog to become more angry. He compared this to prisoners
who are kept in high security/maximum prisons. He then went on further to
say that chaining someone/thing up for a long time and punishing it is only
going to allow its hate and anger to grow, and that once the "dog"is let off
the leash, it would be a mess to see what the reaction to society and the community would be. Therefore, parole and institutions like it are necessary to
reward those who attempt change and reformation, because if you just resort to a strict punishment approach, the "dogs" that are returned to the
community will be beyond human reason and will only seek vengeance.
Now if you haven't figured it out already, the reason I'm bringing this
up is because it shares a striking similarity with the words that the schoolteacher says to his nephew about breaking Sethe, as well as having a connec-
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tion to the idea of people as animals. I'm sure this man that was speaking is
a very nice guy, and maybe I'm just jumping onto this because the two classes were juxtaposed right next to each other, allowing for the realization of
the similar aspects to occur, but this just seems amazing to me. I was planning to write my paper #2 on something entirely different, but now this just
seems to be completely interesting. I suppose it would work into how slaves
were treated as prisoners and how prisoners are in turn treated like animals
(as slaves were also), but I just find this similarity too shocking to let it go.
I'm wondering if you think there is a connection I could make and I guess
how you think I could go about this. (The quote was on page 149 in Beloved
is what I'm referring to.) If there is a weak connection in his metaphor,
please just say so. I just am wondering if there is rather a distinctly definite
one which ties into the fact that [the guest speaker] is white and that this
chapter [in Beloved] was the only one written in the white perspective. I see
why he used his metaphor, yet at the same time, I find it striking that he
compared criminals to dogs and that schoolteacher compares slaves to animals and both are referencing to treatment. Hmmmmmm.... Well, I just really felt the need to get another person's perspective on this, and you
definitely are the person with the most knowledge into what Beloved is
"saying."
So if you could help, I 'd appreciate it. Sorry that this explanation was
so long-I didn't intend it to be! (I hope it all is clear too!) Anyways, thank
you for thinking it over.
Rachel sent me this email me, she later told me, because she had shared
her idea with a good friend and he thought she was crazy, reading more
into the situation than was really there. Was she?, she wanted to know.
Her friend thought she was accusing the speaker of being a hypocrite. She
was not, she assured me. She simply wanted to understand the discourses
surrounding her.
Coincidentally, Rachel emailed me a few days before I spoke about rhetorical listening at UW-M. By listening to her listening, I not only heard but
began to see possibilities for rhetorical listening. For Rachel, by laying the
guest lecture and Beloved in front of her and letting them lie there, was attempting to invent topics and arguments for her second essay, hence rhetorical listening as a trope for interpretive invention. And Rachel was
proceeding with her project for a number of reasons. First, she wanted to
understand the discourses surrounding her so that, when she graduated
from college, she could act ethically as an employee within whatever system she found herself. Second, she wanted to avoid a guilt/blame logic. Her
intent was not to nail the guest lecturer for hypocrisy; in fact, she went to
great lengths in paragraph two to describe the guest speaker positively,
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even later calling him a "nice guy" in paragraph three. Her intent was to
work within a responsibility logic, wherein she could question his discourse and, albeit limitedly, participatein her own socialization. Third, she
was intrigued by the commonalities and differences in the two discourses:
both liken people to animals and justify behaviors on the grounds of productivity, yet Schoolteacher perpetuates a belief that some people are animals while the guest lecturer resists this notion. Moreover, Rachel heard
commonalities and differences in their cultural logics: both seem haunted
by privileges of whiteness and gender even as Schoolteacher reinscribes an
inhumane slave economy and the guest lecturer tries to reform the Wisconsin prison economy.
Was Rachel's listening process as neat and orderly as the previous paragraph makes it appear? Of course not. You can tell that from listening to
her email. She notes that something "'strange'"is haunting her, which she
cannot pinpoint for herself. She is hesitant about her ideas so she waits
until paragraphtwo to announce "Now to the point" although she follows
that assertion with an ellipsis, which signifies a gap, an absence (of clarity?
connection? confidence?). And although Rachel is quite articulate, summarizing the guest lecture and noting its possible connections to Beloved,
she feels the need for someone else to put it into perspective; she has
heard the commonalities and differences, but she cannot see the connections clearly. The two discourses are lying before her, but she cannot connect them for herself in ways that make sense within her concept of the
logos.Because part of my job as a teacher is to help students conceptualize
their thinking processes in relation to larger cultural logics, I analyzed her
e-mail for method and experienced the serendipitous pleasure of having
my thinking about rhetorical listening clarified, which in turn enabled me
to offer her a perspective on her topic.
So what perspective did I offer Rachel? Did I think she was crazy? Obviously not. I think she has a definite talent, not for "readingmore into the situation" as her friend had suggested but for listening to the exiled excess in
our daily dialectical dialogues, for hearing what Morrison calls "the sound
that [breaks] the back of words" (Beloved261). And I think this talent was
spurred,in part, by Rachel'sliterally hearing the two discourses side by side
and then letting them lie before her, echoing in her ears. So I encouraged
her to write the paper, even offering her some of my thoughts and readings.
When I read her paper, I found her most interesting writing (at least in
terms of my thinking about rhetorical listening and pedagogy) occurring
in the final paragraph:
It seemsthatwhite "rule-abiding"
societycouldbe sufferingfromfear.They
couldbe worriedthat both criminalsand blacksare inherentlyno different
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than themselves,and with that as fact, how do they make themselvesfeel
superior?If everyoneis equal,they arethe same,and if whitesarethe same
as blacksand "rule-abiding"
citizensare the same as criminals,how can we
compareourselvesto an Other?Howcan we bolsterthe feelingof superiority over the inferiorgroupsof peoplewho arejust a bit behindus evolutionarily,if they arereallynot inferioror evolutionarilybehind?Thequestionis:
why do we need to feel superior?Whatdoes this say aboutus? Whathave
we become?
Rachel's conclusion intrigues me on many levels. One is its pronoun usage. In thinking through this cultural concern, Rachel has trouble with
pronoun shifts, not in terms of grammatical agreement but in terms of
who-is-what. Her category of "white rule-abiding society" is a theyto her;
yet because she is a white rule-abiding citizen herself, the category is also
a we. But that implication is not yet articulated in Rachel's writing, perhaps
because she does not see herself as being someone who needs to make
others feel inferior. While she can listen to her guest lecturer and Toni
Morrison, she seems not yet able to listen to her own text, at least not
here, hence the importance of teaching rhetorical listening as a trope for
interpretive invention that applies not just to the discourses of others but
also to the discoursesof one's self. A second level that intrigues me is her use
of questions. She concludes with questions that we, as teachers, might traditionally suggest should occur in her introduction as a frame for her paper,
around which her paper would be developed. Although Rachel had initially
desired to answer these questions in her paper, she could not, she told me
when she handed in the paper,because the questions-especially as they related to whiteness-were so new to her world view, hence the importance
of teaching rhetoricallistening as a code for cross cultural conduct.
When I first listened to Rachel's email and paper, I was richly rewarded
in that she helped me clarify my thinking about rhetorical listening. When
I revisited her texts during the writing of this piece, I was challenged to be
a better pedagogue. For what echoes in my ears is her email phrase: "he
told a metaphor." It signifies both her awareness that language functions
tropologically and also her assumption that tropes are something that can
be told, added on for explanation or decoration. As a teacher, my challenge is to reinforce in students the former idea and disabuse them of the
latter. For understanding the tropologizing functions of language, not simply as a manner of style but as the very "nature"of language itself, is one
way of understanding how conflicting discourses can lie before us, reverberating with the potential to be negotiated via rhetorical listening. As
such, teaching rhetorical listening is one way of tackling the pronoun
problem that haunts all our lives: how to see we in theyand theyin we. It is
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also a way of emphasizing for students the importance of keeping questions in play, maybe even using them as/in a conclusion.
So Where Does That Leave Us?
Defining rhetoricallisteningas a trope of interpretive invention not only
emphasizes the discursive nature of rhetorical listening but also plays with
the etymology of the term tropeas "a turning." For rhetorical listening
turns hearing (a reception process) into invention (a production process),
thus complicating the reception/production opposition and inviting rhetorical listening into the time-honored tradition of rhetorical invention.18
Second, rhetorical listening turns the realm of hearing into a larger space,
one encompassing all discursive forms, not just oral ones. Third, rhetorical
listening turns intent back on the listener, focusing on listening with intent, not for it. Fourth, rhetorical listening turns the meaning of the text
into something larger than itself, certainly larger than the intent of the
speaker/writer, in that rhetorical listening locates a text as part of larger
cultural logics. And fifth, rhetorical listening turns rhetoric's traditional focus on the desires of speaker/writer into a harmonics and/or dissonance of
the desires of both the speaker/writer and the listener.
In sum, rhetorical listening broadens our possibilities for interpretive
invention. When employed as a "code of cross-cultural conduct," rhetorical listening has the potential to generate more productive discourses
about and across both commonalities and differences, whether these discourses be narratives or arguments, whether they be in academic journals
or over the dinner table. As such, rhetorical listening responds to the need
exemplified by Annie and Lora and promotes the possibility exemplified
by Ruth and Naomi...and Rachel.
For helping me think through this project, I would like to thank the 1998
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Notes
1. By using the term interpretive
invention,I
hope to demonstrate the necessary iptersections between interpretation,which is the
dominant term for making meaning in philosophical hermeneutics, and invention,which
is the dominant term for making meaning in
rhetorical studies.
2. In his foreword to Lunsford'sReclaiming
Rhetorica,James Murphy claims that the au-

thors of the essays "point to new places to
look" for rhetorical history, theory, and practice (xi). His claim reflectsthe dominant trend
in our field of employing a sight metaphor.
Lunsford'suse of an auditory metaphor, listening, supplements this trend.
3. For a history of genderas an analytical
category within academic scholarship and for
a discussion of whether gender studies
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should replace or supplement feminist studies, see Showalter (1-13). Although I use the
term race, I recognize that it is a highly contested term in that it is a trope for that which
does not exist but which has become ideologically "real" in U. S. culture. See Lerner for a
history of the term's usage in the U. S. and
for an excellent discussion of current thinking about alternatives to its usage (184-98).
Also see Dyson, who defines race as follows:
"Race is not a card. It is a condition. It is a set
of beliefs and behaviors shaped by culture,
rooted in history, and fueled by passions that
transcend reason" (42).
4. Royster is not alone in calling for "codes
of cross-cultural conduct." Michael Eric Dyson argues that articulating such codes is necessary because "[w]e still don't know the
rules of race" (8). But by "rules of race" Dyson refers not just to codes of cross-cultural
conduct but also to "the unwritten codes of
conduct within black communities" (8). I
agree with Dyson. I would argue further that
we need to explore the unwritten codes of
gender and ethnicity within other communities as well and that we need to explore the
functions of whiteness in every community.
For too often the functions of whiteness are
invisible in our culture; we rarely think of
white as a "color" (as evidenced by the terms
women of color and people ofcolor), and too often the functions of whiteness create a double-bind in certain circles succeeding in
school can be perceived as "acting white").
5. My assumption here is that because
sexism and racism are structurally embedded
in our culture and, hence, ourselves, they affect us all in our daily lives; consequently, we
all have gender and race work to do if we are
not unconsciously to replicate old patterns of
thinking, being, and doing.
6. Martin Jay provides a definition, history, and critique of "ocularcentrism" in order
to argue for a hermeneutic revival of hearing
via Wagner, Nietzsche, and Heidegger: "our
increasing interest in the truths of interpretation rather than the methods of observation
bespeaks a renewed respect for the ear over
the eye as the organ of greatest value (57).
Other philosophers have set the stage for
Jay's claims. Hegel locates hearing as an ideal, arguing that hearing "does not belong to
the sense of action [sens pratiques] but those
of contemplation [sens th6oriques]; and is, in
fact, still more ideal than sight" (qtd. in Derrida 100). And Emmanuel Levinas, an anti-
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Hegelian who champions the ethical, not the
ideal, also elevates sound over sight: "the
glance by itself, contrary to what one may be
led to believe, does not respect the other....
This is why Levinas places sound above light"
(Derrida 99).
7. I am indebted to Doug Day for calling
this idea to my attention.
8. Gordon Pradl pointed out in his review
of this article that Louise Rosenblatt introduced a method of reading that closely resembles what I am calling listening in that
her method also works to preserve the ideas
of others within one's interpretation.
9. Their cross-cultural listening may be
further complicated by the animosity between their cultures. Scholars disagree about
the date of the book of Ruth, a disagreement
that has implications for the degree of animosity existing between the Judeans and the
Moabites: As the New English Bible notes:
Some scholars consider Ruth a postexilic literary creation, though perhaps based on an
older tale; on this view, it was intended to
counteract the harsh decrees of Ezra and Nehemiah against foreign wives (Ezra 10. 1-5;
Neh. 13. 23-27). Other scholars, however,
date it much earlier, during the reigns of the
first kings of Judah, before bitter enmity toward Moab had developed...." (277)
For a brief history of the term under10.
standing in narrative studies from Brooks and
Warren to the mid-1990's, see Phelan and
Rabinowitz (5-11). For an accounting of the
relationship between understanding and interpretation in classical hermeneutics, see Bleicher (11-26) and Bruns (21-138). My use of
standing under does not reflect the foundational meanings that KI(enneth Burke ascribes
to John Locke's use of the Greek term hypostasis, which means, "literally, a standing
under": Hence anything set under, such as
stand, base, bottom, prop, support, stay;
hence metaphorically, that which lies at the
bottom of a thing, as the groundwork, subject-matter, argument of a narrative, speech,
poem; a starting point, a beginning. And
then come the metaphysical meanings...:
Subsistence, reality, real being (as applied to
mere appearance), nature, essence" (Grammar
23). Standing under implies a place, a location, a standpoint for listening.
11. In our current theoretical milieu, other
is a loaded term. For example, in her feminist
critique of Lacanian theory, Elizabeth Grosz
describes the other/Other as follows: for Lacan,
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the "other is the object through whom desire
is returned to the subject; the Other is the locus of signification which regulates the
movement by which this return is made possible" (80). In other words, "the Other is not
a person but a place, the locus of law, language, and the symbolic" (67). As such, it "is
understood here in two senses: as a sociosymbolic network regulated according to language-like rules; and as a psychical structure,
representative of this social Other, internalized in the form of the unconscious" (117).
As I use the term other, I am invoking Lacan's
small "o" other, specifically as a person other
than the listening subject or as the listening
subject listening to itself. My goal for listening is an intersubjectivity, not a continued
subject/object relationship.
12. For a discussion of how autobiography
and ethnography may merge to create a
see Watson,
strategy of autoethnography,
who argues that women may learn to articulate their own stories if they learn to read
their bodies as culturally inscribed texts; also
see Clough and Deck.
13. For other arguments on why whiteness needs to be articulated in our culture,
see Fishkin, Davy, Dyson, Hill, Ignatiev,
hooks ("Representations"),
and Morrison
(Playing).
14. For excellent discussions of how authorization and privilege (or lack thereof)
function in academic discourse and how
their consequences play out, see Roof and
Weigman's collection, which explores the
question that is also their title: Who Can
Speak?
15. Marshall Gregory describes scholarly
debate as warfare: "So much critical discourse in the humanities-at
least since the
culture wars began about
contemporary
conducted
in a
twenty
years ago-is
scorched-earth, take-no-prisoners tone that
at first irritates, then pains, and eventually
numbs everyone's professional nerves, leaving the main combatants (and many of the

rest of us as well) worn out with struggle and
wondering if internecine warfare is really
what we meant to sign up for when we enthusiastically and jauntily set out for graduate school years ago" (89).
16. What constitutes a "white" body and a
"non-white" body changes over time and
place as demonstrated in Ignatiev's How the
Irish Became White.
17. Audre Lorde calls such a cultural norm
a "mythical norm" and defines it as "white,
thin, male, young, heterosexual, christian,
and financially secure ("Age, Race" 116).
18. Karen LeFevre cites four categories of
of
invention:
(1) a private apprehension
truth, based on Platonic theory; (2) an internal dialogue of selves, based on Freudian
theory; (3) a group of people's collaborative
construction of truth, based on George Herbert Mead's theory; and (4) a collective analysis of how cultural codes socialize people's
behaviors and attitudes, based on Imile
Durkeim's theory (48-50). Like LeFevre's
categories of collaborative and collective invention, rhetorical listening is concerned
with how people construct meanings as well
as with how cultural codes socialize people
and how people both employ and change
these codes to negotiate with one another.
Like classical and neo-classical invention,
rhetorical listening asks questions of texts; it
also asks questions of the cultural logics
within which these texts exist. Like postmodern invention, rhetorical listening searches
for the gaps, the omissions, the unknowns,
the contradictions, the questions not in order
to reconcile them but in order to imagine
where they may lead. Like a cultural studies
invention, rhetorical listening also locates interpretation within particular moments and
places to demonstrate how time and place affect interpretation. And given my particular
interest, rhetorical listening may be employed as a feminist invention process to expose how gender intertwines with ethnicity
and other cultural categories.

Works Cited
Aristotle. On Rhetoric:A Theory of CivicDiscourse. Trans. George Kennedy. New York:
Oxford UP, 1991.
Ballif, Michelle. "What Is It That the Audience Wants? Or, Notes Toward Listening

with a Transgendered Ear." CCCC, Phoenix, AZ, March 1997.
Bhabha, Homi. "On the Irremovable
Strangeness of Being Different." PMLA 113
(1998): 34-39.

Ratcliffe/Rhetorical
Listening
Bleicher, Josef. ContemporaryHermeneutics:
Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy, and Critique. Boston: Routledge, 1980.
Bruns, Gerald. Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern. New Haven: Yale UP, 1992.
Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. 1945.
Berkeley: U of California P, 1969.
. A Rhetoric of Motives. 1950. Berkeley:
U of California P, 1969.
Butler, Judith. Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex."New York: Routledge,
1993.
Childers, Mary and bell hooks. "A Conversation about Race and Class." Conflictsin Feminism. Eds. Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox
K(eller. New York: Routledge, 1990. 60-81.
Clough, Patricia Ticineto. "Autotelecommunication and Autoethnography: A Reading
of Carolyn Ellis's Final Negotiations." The Sociological Quarterly 38 (1997): 97-110.
Copeland, Shawn. "Inclusion Is Not Enough:
Some Reflections on Interdisciplinary Conversations." Conversations on Learning
Conference. Marquette U, Milwaukee, WI,
Jan 1998.
Davis, Diane. "Just Listening: A Hearing for
the Unhearable." CCCC, Phoenix, AZ,
March 1997.
Davy, Kate. "Outing Whiteness: A Feminst/
Lesbian Project." Hill 204-25.
Deck, Alice A. "Autoethnography: Zora
Neale Hurston, Noni Jabavu, and CrossDisciplinary Discourse." Black American Literature Forum 24 (1990): 237-56.
Derrida, Jacques. "Violence and Metaphysics:
An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel
Levinas." Writing and Difference. Chicago: U
of Chicago P, 1978. 79-153.
Dyer, Richard. White. New York: Routledge,
1997.
Dyson, Michael Eric. Race Rules: Navigating the
Color Line. New York: Vintage, 1996.
Fishkin, Shelley Fisher. "Interrogating
'Whiteness,' Complicating 'Blackness':
Remapping American Culture. American
Quarterly 47 (1995): 428-66.
Fiumara, Gemma Corradi. The Other Side of
Language: A Philosophy of Listening. New
York: Routledge, 1990.
Frankenberg, Ruth. The Social Constructionof
Whiteness: White Women, Race Matters. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993.
- . "'When We Are Capable of Stopping,
We Begin to See': Being White, Seeing
Whiteness." Thompson and Tyagi 3-18.

223

Fuss, Diana. Identification Papers. New York:
Routledge, 1995.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method.
Trans. Garrett Barden and John Cummings. New York: Seabury P, 1975.
Gilbert, Sandra. "Ethnicity-Ethnicities-Literature-Literatures." PMLA 113 (1998): 19-27.
Giovanni, Nikki. "Annual Conventions of
Everyday Subjects." Racisim 101. New York:
William Morrow, 1994. 83-89.
Gregory, Marshall. "Comment and Response." CollegeEnglish 60 (1998): 89-93.
Grosz, Elizabeth. Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction. New York: Routledge, 1990.
Heidegger, Martin. "Phenomenology and
Fundamental Ontology: The Disclosure of
Meaning." The Hermeneutics Reader.Ed. Kurt
Mueller-Vollmer. New York: Continuum,
1985. 214-40.
. What Is Called Thinking? Trans. F. D.
Wick and J. G. Gray. New York: Harper,
1968.
Hill, Mike. "Introduction: Vipers in ShangriLa." Hill 1-18.
Hill, Mike, ed. Whiteness:A Critical Reader.
New York: New York UP, 1997.
Hooks, bell. "Representations of Whiteness."
Black Looks: Race and Representation. Boston:
South End P, 1992.
Houston, Jeanne Wakatsuki and James D.
Houston. Farewell to Manzanar New York:
Bantam, 1973.
Ignatiev, Noel. How the Irish Became White.
New York: Routledge, 1995.
Jarratt, Susan. Rereading the Sophists: Classical
Rhetoric Refigured. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1991.
Jay, Martin. "The Rise of Hermeneutics and
the Crisis of Ocularcentrism." The Rhetoric of
Interpretation and the Interpretation ofRhetoric.
Ed. Paul Hernandi. Durham: Duke UP,
1989. 55-74.
Keating, AnnLouise. "Interrogating 'Whiteness,' (De)Constructing Race." College English 57 (1995): 901-918.
Kristeva, Julia. "Stabat Mater." The Kristeva
Reader. Ed. Toril Moi. New York: Columbia
UP, 1986. 160-86.
LeFevre, Karen. Invention as Social Act. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1987.
Lerner, Gerda. Why History Matters. New York:
Oxford UP, 1997.
Lorde, Audre. "Age, Race, Class and Sex."
Sister Outsider.Trumanburg: Crossing P,
1984. 114-23.

224

CCC51/December1999

. Excerpt from A Burst of Light: Living
with Cancer. Writing Women s Lives:An Anthologogy of Autobiographical Narratives by
Twentieth-CenturyAmerican Women Writers.
Ed. Susan Cahill. New York: Harper 1994.
284-95.
- . "An Open Letter to Mary Daly." Sister
Outsider Trumanburg: Crossing P, 1984.
66-71.
Lunsford, Andrea, ed. Reclaiming Rhetorica:
Women in the Rhetorical Tradition. Pittsburgh:
U of Pittsburgh P, 1995. 3-8.
Miller, J. Hillis. "Composition and Decomposition: Deconstruction and the Teaching of
Writing." Compositionand Literature:Briding
the Gap. Ed. Winifred Horner. Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 1983. 38-56.
Morrison, Toni. Beloved. New York: Penguin,
1988.
- . Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the
Literary Imagination. New York: Vintage,
1993.
Murphy, James. Foreword. Lunsford ix-xiv.
- . "Rhetorical History as a Guide to the
Salvation of American Reading and Writing: A Plea for Curricular Courage." The
Rhetorical Tradition and Modern Writing. Ed.
James J. Murphy. New York: MLA, 1982.
3-12.
The New English Bible. New York: Oxford UP,
1976.
Piercy, Marge. "The Book of Ruth and
Naomi." No More Masks: An Anthology of
Twentieth-CenturyAmerican Women Poets. Ed.
Florence Howe. New York: Harper, 1993.
277-78.
Phelan, James, and Peter Rabinowitz. Understanding Narrative. Columbus: Ohio State
UP, 1994.
Phelan, James. "Vanity Fair: Listening as a
Rhetorician-and
a Feminist." Out of
Bounds: Male Writersand Gender. Ed. Laura
Claridge and Elizabeth Langland. Amherst:
U of Massachusetts P, 1990. 132-47.
Pradl, Gordon. Literaturefor Democracy:Reading
as a Social Act. Portsmouth: Boynton, 1996.
Rayner, Alice. "The Audience: Subjectivity,
Community, and the Ethics of Listening."
Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism7
(1993): 3-24.
Rich, Adrienne. "Contradictions." YourNative
Land, YourLife: Poems. New York: Norton,
1986. 81-111.
- . "The Distance between Language
and Violence." What is Found There. New
York: Norton, 1993. 181-89.

-

. "Split at the Root: An Essay on Jewish Identity." Blood, Bread, and Poetry. New
York: Norton, 1986. 100-23.
Roof, Judith and Robyn Weigman, eds. Who
Can Speak?: Authority and CriticalIdentity. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1995.
Royster, Jackie Jones. "Borderlands and
Common Spaces: Care and Maintenance in
Our NeutralZones." Oregon State U, Corvalis, OR, August 1997.
Scheunemann, Sara. "Matthew 13: 1-17: 'He
who has ears, let him hear.'" Unpublished
essay, Marquette U, 1996.
Schuman, Amy. "Feminist Ethnography and
the Rhetoric of Accommodation." Oregon
State University, Corvalis, OR, August
1997.
Showalter, Elaine. Speaking of Gender. New
York: Routledge, 1989.
Smith, Lillian. Killers of the Dream. 1949. New
York: Norton, 1994.
Spivak, Gayatri. "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography." In Other Worlds:
Essays in Cultural Politics. New York: Methuen, 1987. 197-221.
Talbot, Margaret. "Getting Credit for Being
White." New YorkTimesMagazine, 30 Nov
1997: 116-19.
Tannen, Deborah. You Just Don 't Understand:
Women and Men in Conversation. New York:
Ballantine, 1990.
Thompson, Becky and Sangeeta Tyagi, eds.
Names We Call Home: Autobiography on Racial
Identity. New York: Routledge, 1996.
Thompson, Becky. "Time Traveling and Border Crossing: Reflections on White Identity." Thompson and Tyagi 93-110.
Vitanza, Victor. Negation, Subjectivity,and the
History ofRhetoric. Albany: State U of New
York P, 1997.
Watson, Julia. "Unruly Bodies: Autoethnography and Authorization in Nafissatou Dallo's De Tilene au Plauteau (A Dakar
Childhood)." Research in African Literatures
28 (1997): 34-56.
Weber, Rachel. "Dehumanization Suffered
Yesterday and Today." Unpublished essay,
Marquette U, 1997.
--.
Email, 5 Nov 1997.
Williams, David Cratis. "Under the Sign of
(An)Nihilation."The Legacyof Kenneth Burke.
Ed. Herbert Simons. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1989. 196-223.

